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UNITED STATES HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
IN AN AGE OF MULTILATERALISM 
CATHERINE POWELL* 
Professor Harold Koh’s thoughtful article ends with the observation that 
“globalization has both sinister and constructive faces.”1  Indeed, we live in a 
world that is increasingly interdependent.  Even some of those opposed to the 
project of globalization ironically depend on the tools of globalization to 
undermine it.  Consider the terrorists who hijacked airplanes on September 11, 
2001 and flew them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, killing 
thousands of innocent civilians from many different nations.  The terrorists 
used the Internet and other online technology to spread the message of hate 
underlying their plot, transnational money transfers to finance it, and 
commercial airlines to execute it.2 
Rather than allow such sinister forms of interdependence to flourish 
without an effective counter-weight, U.S. human rights policy in the twenty-
first century should be more fully engaged in shaping and participating in 
international institutions and legal regimes that promote constructive forms of 
global interdependence.3  However, the United States has disengaged from a 
number of critical efforts to promote rule of law through multilateral 
institutions and regimes.  This disengagement is disturbing and can be 
criticized on both normative and instrumentalist grounds. 
In this Response, I first discuss a number of international initiatives in 
which U.S. participation was sought but rejected or resisted.  Second, I discuss 
normative considerations concerning U.S. participation in international 
 
* Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; Faculty Director, Human Rights 
Institute, Columbia Law School; B.A., Yale University (1987); M.P.A., Princeton University, 
Woodrow Wilson School in Public and International Affairs (1991); J.D., Yale Law School 
(1992).  I would like to thank Jose Alvarez and Mark Quarterman for their helpful comments on 
an earlier version of this piece, as well as Llezlie Green for her invaluable research assistance.  I 
would also like to thank Leslie Butler of the Saint Louis University Law Journal. 
 1. Harold Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 293 (2002). 
 2. Benjamin Barber, Author of Jihad vs. McWorld, Open Society Institute U.S. Programs, 
Forum: Is Democratization a Response to Terrorism? (Nov. 1, 2001) (observing how the terrorists 
used tools of modernity against the project of modernity) (audio of these remarks available at 
http://www.soros.org/usprograms/forum/democracy/ index.html). 
 3. Id. 
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institutions.  Finally, I turn to instrumentalist considerations concerning U.S. 
involvement in these institutions. 
I.  UNITED STATES DISENGAGEMENT FROM INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES 
Despite the United States’ key role in establishing the United Nations 
(U.N.),4 current U.S. policy in the fields of human rights and public 
international law more generally could be described with two words: 
isolationism and unilateralism.  Several prominent examples reflect U.S. 
isolationism in the human rights area: its failure to pay U.N. dues,5 its failure to 
agree to raising the age for recruitment of soldiers to eighteen,6 its withdrawal 
from the World Conference against Racism in Durban,7 and its initial failure to 
 
 4.  For discussion of the role Americans played in developing and sustaining the 
international human rights framework, see MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: 
ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001), and The 
Annual Message to Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 663 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941), which paved the way for critical 
concepts in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  See also LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF 
RIGHTS 156 (1990) (“American constitutionalism can proudly claim an important part in the 
development of international human rights, and in their dissemination to every continent and 
corner.”); Oscar Schachter, International Law Implications of U.S. Human Rights Policies, 24 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 66-69 (1978) (discussing how the United States has given impetus to 
recognition of core human rights as international legal obligations even in the absence of human 
rights treaties). 
 5. For an account of how the United States moved from supporting the “duty to pay” to one 
of unilateral withholding of U.N. due, see Jose E. Alvarez, Legal Remedies and the United 
Nations a la Carte Problem, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 229 (1991).  After the September 11 terrorist 
attacks, the United States paid back most of the dues owed.  See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, House 
Approves $582 Million For Back Dues Owed to U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2001, at A8. 
 6. See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflicts, opened for signature May 25, 2000, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. GAOR, 
54th Sess., 97th plen. mtg., Annex, Agenda Item 116(a), at 2, U.N. Doc. A/Res/54/263 (2000) 
(not yet in force); Elizabeth Olson, U.S. Fights Tide on a Move to Raise the Military Service Age, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2000, at A5. 
 7. Professor Koh is surely correct in suggesting that Secretary of State Powell should have 
participated in the World Conference, as he could have used his participation as an opportunity to 
challenge attempts to use the Conference to assert that “Zionism is racism.”  As Professor Koh 
points out, in challenging this platform, Secretary of State Powell might have been able to use his 
prestige to “redirect[] the Conference agenda toward the real emerging global discrimination 
issues of the twenty-first century, such as caste discrimination, discrimination against refugees, 
workable affirmative action techniques, and other efforts to give meaningful reparations for past 
discrimination.”  Koh, supra note 1, at 309.  The rights of Palestinians are central to these 
concerns, as are the rights of Jews—both of whom have faced a variety of forms of discrimination 
historically and currently.  The problem with asserting that “Zionism is racism” is that it denies 
the legitimacy of Jewish nationalism.  Even while this mantra attempts to advance the grievances 
and aspirations of Palestinians, it fails to make room for the identity and aspirations of Jews.  
Shibley Telhami, Remarks Made at Open Meeting of the Human Rights Watch  (Dec. 5, 2001). 
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sign the International Criminal Court Treaty and the Landmines Convention.8  
In other fields of public international law, the United States has demonstrated a 
similar pattern of isolationism.  For example, in international environmental 
law, the United States walked away from the Kyoto Protocol.9 In the area of 
germ weapons, the United States suspended negotiations on strengthening the 
1972 Biological Weapons Convention, rejecting a draft protocol designed to 
strengthen the 1972 treaty,10 offering instead its own set of proposals.11  
Finally, in the area of small arms trafficking, the United States failed to agree 
with attempts at a U.N. conference to address the devastating humanitarian 
impact of small arms proliferation.12 
The examples of unilateralism are equally stunning.  The United States 
recently announced its unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 Antiballistic 
Missile Treaty,13 despite the fact that “[m]utual abandonment of the accord 
might even have been possible” to negotiate eventually with Russia.14  While 
lawful, “[t]he Bush administration’s decision to abrogate the 1972 Antiballistic 
Missile Treaty with Russia will increase European concerns about American 
unilateralism[.]”15  Equally startling was the United States’ failure to seek 
 
 8. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), 
at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/contents.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2002); United Nations: 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507.  As Professor Koh notes, 
“President Clinton ultimately signed the International Criminal Court treaty on December 31, 
2000 and declared the United States’ intent to sign the Landmines Convention by 2006.” Koh, 
supra note 1, at 306 n.31. 
 9. David E. Sanger, Bush Will Continue to Oppose Kyoto Pact on Global Warming, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 12, 2001, at A1. 
 10. The protocol would have strengthened the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons 
and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583 (entered into force 
Mar. 26, 1975), by requiring treaty members to create a new international organization to conduct 
mandatory inspections of plants in which germ weapons could be made.  Judith Miller, U.S. Seeks 
Changes in Germ War Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2001, at A1. 
 11. Preferring the more sweeping approach taken in the protocol, one veteran European 
diplomat said, “We are ready and willing to work with the Americans to bridge the gaps . . . [b]ut 
we hope this is only a first step and that it opens the door to more sweeping multilateral 
measures.”  Id. 
 12. Barbara Crossette, Effort by U.N. To Cut Traffic In Arms Meets a U.S. Rebuff, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 10, 2001, at A8. 
 13. See Tearing up the ABM Treaty, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2001, at A38. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Steven Erlanger, Bush’s Move On ABM Pact Gives Pause to Europeans, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 13, 2001, at A19 (citing several senior European officials).  “[T]his raises again the question 
of unilateralism,” said one Italian official, who asserted that “[i]t will be damaging in the effort to 
keep the United States involved and engaged in the international treaties that do exist.”  Id.  
Similarly, a senior German official lamented that “the problem is less about missile defense than 
about treaties, about how much the Bush administration respects international obligations.”  Id. 
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Security Council approval for its bombing campaign in Kosovo in response to 
the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians.  While the U.S.–led bombing 
campaign was not strictly unilateral in that it was carried out under the 
auspices of NATO, its failure to seek U.N. Security Council approval marked 
its distaste for working through international institutions.16 
II.  NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS 
As the unquestioned global hegemon, the United States must exercise its 
military, economic and political power within a normative framework that it 
helps construct and reinforce, even as it is constrained by this framework.17  In 
making the case that international institutions should figure into this normative 
framework, in this section, I draw on institutionalist approaches to 
international relations theory.  Because institutionalism is a response to realist 
critiques of international institutions, this section begins with a discussion of 
realism.  I then discuss institutionalist responses to realism to demonstrate why 
institutionalism is a helpful framework for understanding the value of 
international institutions in the human rights area, both as a descriptive and 
normative matter. 
A. Realism 
Realists believe that international institutions do not contribute to peace in 
any significant way, and matter only at the margins.18  Because the core 
assumptions of realism are that “states operate in an anarchic environment and 
behave in a self-interested manner,” realists view international institutions as 
being “based on self-interested calculations of the great powers . . . .”19  Under 
a realist framework, a government conceives of its national interest in a 
narrowly defined way, by determining unilaterally what is in the nation’s best 
interest and advancing these interests through international institutions to the 
 
 16. For a critical analysis of the U.S.-led bombing campaign, see Bruno Simma, NATO, the 
UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (1999), for a discussion on the 
need for Security Council approval, pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. 
 17. I would like to thank my colleague Susan Sturm here, whose thoughtful counsel helped 
me develop this claim.  Note that this claim is consistent with constructivist approaches to 
international relations theory, which view world politics as socially constructed.  Constructivists 
Alexander Wendt notes that “the fundamental structures of international politics are social rather 
than strictly material . . . and that these structures shape actors’ identities and interests, rather than 
just their behavior . . . .”  Alexander Wendt, Constructing International Politics, 20 INT’L 
SECURITY 71, 71-72 (1995).  See also John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang 
Together? Neoutilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. 855 (1998). 
 18. John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT’L 
SECURITY 5, 7 (1994). 
 19. Id. 
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extent it has the power to do so and force other governments to adapt.20  
According to realists, “institutions are basically a reflection of [this] 
distribution of power in the world . . . and they have no independent effect on 
state behavior.”21 
B. Institutionalism 
By contrast, institutionalists assert that institutions can change state 
behavior and facilitate cooperation.22  Here I focus on the institutionalist 
argument that “borrows elements from both liberalism and realism.”23  Like 
realism, this institutionalist argument assumes that state behavior is based on 
self-interest.  However, consistent with liberalism’s focus on the formation of 
interest, these institutionalists emphasize the role of international institutions in 
altering a state’s conception of its self-interest.24 
According to institutionalists, international institutions assist states to 
change their conception of their self-interest by minimizing one of the 
principal obstacles to cooperation among states with mutual interests—
cheating.25  Cheating occurs as a result of the classic prisoners’ dilemma in 
which the likely strategy chosen by a state faced with the choice of either 
cheating or cooperating will be to cheat and hope that another state will pursue 
a cooperative strategy.26  While this ideal outcome maximizes gain for the 
cheating state, if both states pursue this logic, then both will try to cheat the 
other, and consequently both sides may be worse off than had they cooperated. 
An example of this in the human rights area is the treatment of prisoners of 
war.  Lack of cooperation leads to insecurity in that each state is not able to 
guarantee humane treatment for its soldiers captured by the other side during a 
war.  By contrast, cooperation secured under the Third Geneva Convention 
leads states to observe standards guaranteeing humane treatment of captured 
 
 20. Cf. Erlanger, supra note 15, at A19 (quoting a German official: “[I]n the past, 
Washington determined its national interest in shaping international rules, behavior and 
institutions.  ‘Now Washington seems to want to pursue its national interest in a more narrowly 
defined way, doing what it wants and forcing others to adapt . . . .’”) 
 21. Mearsheimer, supra note 18, at 7. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Robert O. Keohane, Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War, 
in NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 269, 271 (David A. 
Baldwin ed., 1993). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Mearsheimer, supra note 18, at 17 (describing cheating as principal obstacle to 
cooperation according to what he describes as “liberal” institutionalists).  Mearsheimer refers to 
the “centrality of the prisoners’ dilemma and cheating to the liberal institutionalist literature . . . .”  
Id. at 17 n.47. 
 26. Id. at 17.  See also William J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and International Legal 
Scholarship, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 227, 242-56 (1997) (summarizing substantial 
literature by scholars of international relations and game theory). 
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enemy soldiers.27  In agreeing to observe the Geneva Conventions, though not 
necessarily prisoner of war status, for the Taliban prisoners detained at the U.S. 
naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, the United States has half-way 
acknowledged a value of cooperation in this context—laying the groundwork 
for fair treatment of U.S. soldiers captured in future wars.28  A similar example 
involves cooperative arrangements requiring that states notify a detained or 
arrested foreign national of her right to consult with an official from the 
consulate of the foreign national’s home country.29  Lack of cooperation 
between two states leaves both sides worse off in the sense that it is difficult to 
ensure access to citizens detained or arrested overseas.  Through notification of 
the right to consult with a consular official, cooperation ensures a minimal 
level of access and protection.  Here, the United States has begun to 
acknowledge the value of cooperation by providing law enforcement officials 
with information regarding the notification requirement.30 
To deter cheaters and protect victims, institutional rules can change a 
state’s calculations about how to maximize gain, by assisting states realize that 
short term sacrifices in terms of cooperation will lead to long-term gains.31  
Rules can alter this calculation, for example, by rewarding states that develop 
reputations for adherence to international rules; by creating greater 
 
 27. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature 
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (requiring that prisoners of war receive humane treatment; are 
not punished for not providing additional information beyond their name, rank, birth date and 
serial number; and are entitled to a right to be tried before the same courts with the same 
procedures that the detaining power’s military personnel would face, offering “the essential 
guarantees of independence and impartiality”). 
 28. Katharine Q. Seelye, In Shift, Bush Says Geneva Rule Fit Taliban Captives, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 8. 2002, at A1 (describing that Secretary of State Colin Powell won over other Bush 
Administration officials to observe the Geneva Conventions, “largely on the premise that 
American soldiers needed Geneva protection”). 
 29. This right can be found in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, bilateral 
agreements, and is considered to be a customary international law norm.  See Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, art. 42, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
 30. Compare Catherine W. Brown, Assistant Legal Adviser for Counselor Affairs, State 
Department, Office of the Legal Adviser, Remarks at the American Society of International Law, 
2001 Annual Meeting, International Law and the Work of Federal and State Governments (April 
4-7, 2001) 14 (“[W]hat I have been trying to do is to get federal, state and local law 
enforcement[,] judicial and other officials to comply with these notification requirements.”) 
(transcript on file with author and Saint Louis University Law Journal), with Breard v. Greene, 
523 U.S. 371 (1998) (denying certiorari in case challenging death sentence where the defendant 
was not notified of his right to consult a consular official).  For information regarding the 
American Society of International Law 2001 Annual Meeting, see http://www.asil.org/ 
annual_meeting/ 2001/index.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2002). 
 31. Jose E. Alvarez, The WTO as Linkage Machine, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 146 (2002) 
(“International regimes . . . enable parties to escape perennial prisoners’ dilemmas by replacing 
short-term calculations of interest with long-term strategic analysis and mutual reliance on long-
term regulation[.]”). 
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interdependence between states thereby raising the cost of cheating; by 
increasing the amount of available information to ensure effective monitoring 
of adherence and early warning of cheating; and by reducing the transaction 
costs of individual agreements, thereby making cooperation more profitable for 
self-interested states.32 
One prominent realist, John Mearsheimer, argues that institutionalism 
ignores another principal obstacle to cooperation—the fact that states measure 
their own gains relative to gains of other states, or what realists call “relative-
gains concerns.”33  However, institutionalists Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin 
point out that distributional conflict arising from relative gains “may render 
institutions more important.”34  Because more than one cooperative outcome 
typically exists, “states involved may not agree on which of these outcomes is 
preferred, as each has different distributional implications.”35  While such 
disagreement is a major obstacle to cooperation, because international 
institutions provide “valuable information . . . about the distribution of gains 
from cooperation . . . [they] can step in to provide ‘constructed focal points’ 
that make particular cooperative outcomes prominent.”36 
As a descriptive matter, institutionalism usefully explains why self-
interested states cooperate and how forms of cooperation change states’ 
conceptions of self-interest.  As a normative matter, institutionalism is helpful 
because if all states relied solely on self-interest unchecked by forms of 
collaboration to reshape self-interest, we would live in a world of chaos.  
Because of its hegemony and ability to impact the global normative 
framework, U.S. participation in international institutions reshapes self-interest 
both for itself and the world.  Reconstituted conceptions of states’ self interests 
that favor collaboration can, in turn, shift normative expectations toward 
greater compliance with human rights. 
III.  INSTRUMENTALIST CONSIDERATIONS 
In this section, I consider two instrumentalist considerations that rely on 
realist assumptions that states act in a self-interested manner.  First, the United 
States would be more credible and therefore more effective in advancing 
respect for human rights law overseas if it led by example.  The credibility of 
U.S. human rights policy suffers so long as the United States applies a double 
standard—insisting that other states comply with international human rights 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Mearsheimer, supra note 18. 
 34. Robert Keohane & Lisa Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, 20 INT’L 
SECURITY 39, 45 (1995) (responding to Mearsheimer’s article, The False Promise of 
International Institutions, supra note 18). 
 35. Id. (describing how multiple equilibriums lead to disagreement in game theory logic). 
 36. Id. 
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regimes, but often refusing to participate in these regimes itself.  Second, U.S. 
efforts to advance human rights overseas would be more persuasive and 
therefore more effective if these efforts were informed by first-hand experience 
in applying international standards. 
Both points are demonstrated in the U.S. efforts to promote women’s 
human rights in Afghanistan.  The United States would have both more 
credibility and greater experience to draw on women’s human rights once it 
ratifies the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW).37  Once it ratifies CEDAW, the United States will 
have more influence at the international level, both as a matter of principle and 
as a matter of institutional competence.  If the United States were to participate 
in international institutions, such as the CEDAW Committee, it could take a 
more principled stand, increase its knowledge and experience in women’s 
human rights and strengthen the capacity of international institutions to ensure 
compliance. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
I end where I began with Professor Koh’s quote, “globalization has both 
sinister and constructive faces.”38  A twenty-first century U.S. human rights 
policy must “use the constructive face of globalization to overcome its most 
destructive face.”39  This requires U.S participation in and compliance with 
international regimes.40  In this Response, I have argued in support of 
multilateralism as a constructive face of globalization on both normative and 
instrumentalist grounds.41  Rather than living in satisfaction in a world whose 
fabric of interdependence is woven with seeds of despair and anger,42 the 
 
 37. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened 
for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. 
 38. Koh, supra note 1, at 344. 
 39. Id. at 331. 
 40. As Michael Ignatieff has pointed out in considering U.S exceptionalism, it is important 
to distinguish U.S. nonparticipation from noncompliance.  Michael Ignatieff, No Exceptions?, 1 
LEGAL AFF. 59 (2002). 
 41. Of course, multilateral institutions themselves have sinister as well as constructive sides.  
For discussion of the drawbacks of multilateralism, see Jose E. Alvarez’s scholarship.  See, e.g., 
Jose E. Alvarez, supra note 31, at 11 (describing drawbacks of multilateral institutions and treaty 
regimes); Jose E. Alvarez, Multilateralism and its Discontents, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 393-411 
(2000) (summarizing hazards of multilateralism); and Jose E. Alavarez, Crimes of States/Crimes 
of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365-483 (1999) (exploring shortcomings of 
the International Tribunal for Rwanda).  Through greater engagement in international 
organizations, the United States can promote the constructive side of multilateralism and 
discourage the hazards. 
 42. For an astute discussion of how this despair and anger has taken root in Europe, where 
Muslim immigrants find it hard to assimilate (and where many of the September 11th hijackers 
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United States should promote constructive forms of globalization whose 
foundation and sustainability are bolstered by international institutions and the 
rule of law. 
 
studied), see Thomas L. Friedman, The 2 Domes of Belgium, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002, at 13.  
Friedman states. 
What radicalized the Sept. 11 terrorists was not that they suffered from poverty of food, it 
was that they suffered from a poverty of dignity.  Frustrated by the low standing of 
Muslim countries in the world, compared with Europe or the United States, and the low 
standing in which they were personally held where they were living, they were easy 
pickings for militant preachers who knew how to direct their rage. 
Id. 
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